


## Time to rethink the common view

David Matsumoto<sup>1,2</sup> 

<sup>1</sup>Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, and <sup>2</sup>Humintell, El Cerrito, California, USA

Y. Takano and E. Osaka (2018, this issue) provide strong and irrefutable empirical evidence that the “common view”—that Japanese are typically collectivists whereas Americans are typically individualists—is not supported by data. Given other reviews in the past that have led to the same conclusion, in this commentary, I argue that now is the time for the field to take stock and reconsider this common view. This commentary briefly describes conceptual, empirical, and practical problems concerning the common view and offers suggestions to move beyond it. By moving beyond the common view, and other similar explanations of cross-cultural differences, cross-cultural researchers in particular can lead the way in facilitating a further evolution of research and theory about the link between cultures and individuals.

*Keywords:* collectivism, common view, culture, ecological fallacy, individualism, stereotypes

The cultural dimension known as individualism versus collectivism (I/C) has had an incredible impact on cross-cultural theory and research over the past half-century or so. One domain of study that has contributed strongly to this genre of research has involved U.S.–Japan cross-cultural comparisons documenting differences between these two nation cultures. Within this domain, a view concerning the nature of those cultural differences is what Takano and Osaka (2018) referred to as the “common view”—that Japanese are typically collectivists whereas Americans are typically individualists.

This common view has persisted for decades despite prior influential reviews refuting it (Matsumoto, 1999, 2002; Matsumoto, Kudoh, & Takeuchi, 1996; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002; Takano & Osaka, 1997, 1999), at least on the level of the individual. Takano and Osaka (2018) pounded another nail into the coffin of this common view, providing strong and irrefutable empirical evidence that the common view is simply not supported by data. They also argued convincingly that issues concerning student sampling, possible reference-group effects, response and publication biases, and the dimensionality of the I/C construct do not alter their main conclusions. Now is the time for the field to take stock and reconsider this common view, widely extended to other cross-cultural comparisons as well. This commentary briefly describes conceptual, empirical, and practical

problems concerning the common view and offers suggestions to move beyond it using the accumulated wisdom from research over the last half-century or so.

### Why Is the Common View Problematic?

#### Conceptual Issues

**Culture-level effects do not necessarily translate to individuals.** One conceptual problem of the common view is the inappropriate conflation of culture- and individual-level effects. “American individualism” and “Japanese collectivism” refer to cultural differences on the societal (ecological or group) level and not necessarily to individuals in those cultures. In the Hofstede (1980, 1984, 2001) studies, for example, arguably the most widely cited research documenting the I/C dimension, the I/C dichotomy emerged from country-level analyses of mean data aggregated across individual respondents from surveys. Although individuals provided the initial source data, those data were averaged across individuals within each country and the country means were used as data; thus, countries, not individuals, were the unit of analysis in the subsequent factor analyses.

In this country-level analysis, I/C emerged as a single, bipolar, dichotomously labelled dimension with individualism on one pole and collectivism on the other. The United States, Japan, and all other countries surveyed were then placed along the dimension on the basis of their mean scores on this dimension. Similar country-level analyses have been performed by others who have generated cross-cultural data on values or social axioms (Bond et al., 2004; House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2003; Schwartz, 2004; see review by Smith, in

*Correspondence:* David Matsumoto, Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, 1600 Holloway Avenue, San Francisco, California 94132, USA. E-mail: dm@sfsu.edu

Received 17 June 2018; accepted 25 June 2018.

press), where national cultures are placed on a single point along a scale or dimension. In these studies, cultures are operationalized as a country or a nation.

The common view is problematic because it takes this country-level difference and interprets a cultural dimension of the country—for example, that American culture is individualistic and that Japanese culture is collectivistic—and then further applies that culture-level difference to individual members of those cultures. American individuals are treated as if they are all individualistic and Japanese individuals are treated as if they are all collectivistic; that is, the common view essentially imposes a country-level effect (I/C) onto individual members of those nation cultures. This imposition mistakenly eliminates differences between culture- and individual-level psychological differences. American individuals are assumed to be individualistic because they function within an individualistic culture and Japanese individuals are assumed to be collectivistic because they function within a collectivistic culture. In this common view, culture and individuals become synonymous.

In actuality, methodologists have acknowledged for decades that culture-level effects do not necessarily translate to the individual level. Campbell (1958) originally referred to this as the ecological fallacy. Ironically, Hofstede (1980, chap. 1) did so, too, warning readers against committing this logical fallacy with his findings. In the domain of cross-cultural research, many works over the years have pointed to the difference between cultural- and individual-level effects and the difficulties in attributing findings from one level to the other (Fontaine & Fischer, 2011; Matsumoto & Yoo, 2006; van de Vijver & Poortinga, 2002). The common view commits the ecological fallacy by conflating cultural-, usually national-level effects with individual-level effects.

Takano and Osaka's (2018) review, along with others cited above, provide convincing evidence that presumed I/C differences on the country level do not necessarily translate to IC-related differences on the individual level, at least in a U.S.–Japan comparison. Notably, all the studies Takano reviewed collected data from individuals and analysed those data using individuals, not cultures, as the unit of analysis. In this case, the data clearly do not support an IC-related interpretation of any differences on presumed IC-related phenomena. These empirical findings, replicated across researchers, laboratories, and methodologies, strongly suggest that the field abandon the common view as a conceptual framework for interpreting U.S.–Japan differences if data are collected and analysed using individuals as the unit of analysis. Instead, we should consider other frames to interpret differences within and across cultures and conduct studies accordingly.

**Japanese culture may not be the optimal exemplar of collectivism.** Questions also exist concerning whether Japanese culture is the optimal exemplar of collectivism. Close inspection of the original Hofstede (2001) data, for instance, raises questions concerning this aspect of the common view. In Appendix 5.1 of Hofstede (2001), for example, 83 countries are listed with cultural value dimension index scores on I/C. The United States has the highest score while Japan is 40th, in the midrange of scores. While Japan's placement on this dimension is clearly not as individualistic as that of the United States, it also is clearly not as collectivistic as many other countries. Regardless, these scores refer to placement of countries, not of individuals within those countries.

**Self-concepts are not bipolar, dichotomous, mutually exclusive categories.** The common view received a special boost from Markus and Kitayama's (1991) seminal article positing the existence of independent versus interdependent self-construals. This theory suggested that individuals in individualistic cultures have independent self-construals whereas individuals in collectivistic cultures have interdependent self-construals. By extension, U.S. Americans had independent selves framed by their individualistic culture whereas the Japanese had interdependent selves framed by their collectivistic culture.

This self-construal theory was timely in fostering a new cross-cultural wave of theory and research and has undoubtedly made enormous contributions over the past several decades. One of its major contributions has been further theory and research on self across cultures. Today, these theories and research make clear that the field needs to go beyond simple, dichotomous, bipolar descriptions of selves across cultures. Even before Markus and Kitayama's (1991) article, scholars had suggested that the self is better understood as a multifaceted construct, both conceptually (Waterman, 1981) and empirically (Triandis, 1989). Decades ago, Waterman (1981) noted that individualism was not antithetical to social interdependence (collectivism), as is traditionally thought and espoused by the common view. Triandis (1989) proposed the existence of three types of selves—private, public, and collective—that coexist in everyone, and suggested that individuals sampled different self-construals depending on the specific context in which they were functioning. Recent cross-cultural research has shown that multiple self-construals exist in people of different national cultures (Kashima & Hardie, 2000; Kashima, Yamaguchi, Kim, & Choi, 1995; Uleman, Rhee, Bardoliwalla, Semin, & Toyama, 2000) and even to different degrees within national cultures depending on geographical area within the nation (Kashima et al., 2004).

Moreover, the cultural values of people of different national cultures vary depending on the specific ecological context where they live within that nation (Matsumoto, Weissman, Preston, Brown, & Kupperbusch, 1997; Rhee, Uleman, & Lee, 1996). People switch from one mode to the other depending on context (Bhawuk & Brislin, 1992) and different behaviours can be elicited in the same individuals if different self-construals are primed (Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999; Kimmelmeier & Cheng, 2004; Trafimow, Silverman, Fan, & Law, 1997; Trafimow, Triandis, & Goto, 1991; Verkuyten & Pouliasi, 2002; Ybarra & Trafimow, 1988). Individuals can clearly balance both the need to belong with the need to be different (Brewer, 2004; Hornsey & Jetten, 2004). The latest and most comprehensive work in this area has demonstrated that selfhood across cultures can be best described along seven dimensions, not two bipolar opposites, all accessed differently by people and facilitated to different degrees by national-ethnic cultures (Vignoles et al., 2016). These numerous findings align well with multiple theoretical calls for understanding self as multifaceted, multidimensional, somewhat contextualized, and dynamic (Cross & Morris, 2003; Cross, Morris, & Gore, 2002; Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984; Guisinger & Blatt, 1994; Kâğıtçıbaşı, 1994, 1996; Kosmitzki, 1996; Niedenthal & Beike, 1997; Oyserman, 1993; Oyserman, Gant, & Ager, 1995).

Thus, the notion that cultures are associated with a single sense of self, or even *primarily* with one sense of self, is not consistent with the literature and imposes a false dichotomy based on the erroneous assumption that cultures are homogeneous, externally distinctive, and geographically located. These presumptions were not true in the past and are increasingly implausible in today's world (Cai, Huang, & Jing, in press; Hermans & Kempen, 1998; Rosenmann & Kurman, in press). Cultures likely facilitate differences in the relative weighting of these multimodal, multidimensional, multidomain selves across different contexts. This understanding of self and individuality is clearly at odds with simple, bipolar, dichotomous views of individuals and the application of the simple, dichotomous, bipolar common view ignores this vast area of research and this complex, sophisticated, and nuanced view of the self across cultures. The field must transcend the common view.

### **Empirical Issues: Using the Common View Is an Easy (but Mistaken) Way of Interpreting Differences in Cross-Cultural Research**

Despite the wealth of theory and research described earlier demonstrating that the common view is not supported conceptually or empirically, why has it

persisted? I believe that using the common view (i.e., that differences in a U.S.–Japan comparison on a variable of interest occurred because Americans are individualistic and Japanese are collectivistic) is an easy, but mistaken, way of interpreting differences in cross-cultural research. When U.S.–Japan (or any cross-national) differences are found, simply attributing those cross-national differences to have occurred because of underlying “cultural” differences in the individuals studied is simple, quick, and citable, especially when *I/C* is invoked. This attributional style has often been used especially in two culture comparisons that did not include any contextual or personality variables that mediated the cultural differences. I myself have done so in my previous work (Matsumoto, 1990, 1992; Matsumoto et al., 2002; Matsumoto & Ekman, 1989; Matsumoto, Kasri, & Kookan, 1999).

This application of the common view in research may be a form of confirmation bias, a bias in judgement and decision-making that psychologists are very knowledgeable about as a research topic but that we may overlook in conceptualizing our own research and interpreting our results. There are serious problems and limitations with this way of interpreting findings in cross-cultural studies. The attribution of cross-cultural differences to any source, whether the common view or something entirely different, is not empirically justified without empirical evidence that documents the links between cultures and individuals, the observed differences, and their underlying sources.

These empirical links can be demonstrated in multiple ways. In quasi-experimental research, which probably characterizes the vast bulk of cross-cultural comparisons, those sources need to be assessed as context or personality variables and their mediational effects on the cultural differences documented. In experiments, those sources need to be controlled as independent variables so that any cultural differences can be attributed to those manipulations. In multilevel studies, individual-level variables can form lower level data, context or personality data can form intermediate-level data, ecological and other cultural factors can form higher level data, and the links among the levels can be assessed statistically. Methodologists have called for these types of linkage studies for decades (Bond, 2002, 2004; August, in press, 1988; Byrne & Matsumoto, in press; Matsumoto & Yoo, 2006; Poortinga, van Vijver, Joe, & van Koppel, 1987). Although such studies have increased over the years, the persistence of the common view strongly has suggested that these types of methodological paradigms have not taken hold well enough in the field. They should; otherwise, the field is left with empty, vacuous, even circular “explanations” for cross-cultural differences.

### **Practical Issues: Applying the Common View Essentially Imposes Stereotypes on Individuals**

Despite the clear reasoning and the growing evidence that the common view is not supported on the individual level (Takano & Osaka, 2018), researchers have continued to impose culture-level differences onto individuals, which is problematic because of the reasons described earlier. One may even argue that such an unwarranted extension of country-level effects onto individual members within a culture is tantamount to the imposition of group-level stereotypes onto individual members of those groups. Thus, the common view reinforces cultural stereotypes about not only national cultures but also of the many individual members of those nation cultures. The common view is akin to the notion of national character, a view of cultural differences in personality that has long fallen out of favour. Today the field recognizes and insists upon observing the many differences between culture on the group or societal level and personality on the individual level (Allik & Realo, in press). The common view blurs these essential differences.

The common view may be especially problematic because of the content used in characterizing people. The common view recognizes and celebrates the individuality of one group (American individualists) while reducing, if not eliminating, the individuality of another (Japanese collectivists). Aside from potential ethical issues concerning such pigeonholing portrayals, psychologists should raise theoretical and empirical questions about the conceptual bases of such claims. Do Japanese individuals really have less individuality than American individuals? Or is their individuality conceived and expressed differently, perhaps outside of ways of explicit observation or current data-collection methods? These issues can be addressed empirically. For example, do researchers find variance in data to be smaller in Japanese samples than that in American samples? That important issue is rarely reported in cross-cultural psychological comparisons.

The common view also is persistent in everyday language and discourse about presumed cultural differences. Americans, Japanese, and others alike often reinforce such views when talking about themselves or others. American individualism is an ideological concept that is used in everyday language and discourse among U.S. Americans to explain and justify behaviour. Likewise, Japanese collectivism is an ideological concept that is used in everyday language and discourse among Japanese to explain and justify behaviour. It also is a concept found in many works about the presumed uniqueness of the Japanese people (*nihonjinron*). Thus,

application of the common view finds utility in social discourse in both countries.

But ideologies are not necessarily predictive of actual behaviours (Matsumoto, 2006) and the common view ignores individual differences and pigeonholes people into dichotomous and fundamentally different cultural categories. To be sure, this outcome is inevitable for any group difference based on individual-level data that is attributed to a simple, bipolar, dichotomous source systematically applied to the groups. But application of the common view as an interpretation of cultural differences is tantamount to the promulgation and reinforcement of cultural stereotypes to people. Cross-cultural psychologists should be leading the way in describing cultural differences in ways that do not apply and reinforce stereotypes or minimize individual differences but go beyond such stereotypes to instead represent the diversity that exists within any national culture. Psychologists also can lead the way to finding similarities among people, not just differences.

### **Time To Move Forward and Transcend the Common View**

It is time to seriously rethink the common view. Although the common view clearly had an enormous and positive impact on the field by fuelling so much culturally comparative research in the past few decades, the fact that the common view still persists as a conceptual and interpretational model of cultural differences is a disservice to the field and to knowledge generation because doing so merely applies a culture-level concept to members of a culture. If nothing else, psychology is the very discipline that should celebrate the uniqueness of each individual in each culture. Cross-cultural researchers face the tough task of understanding group-level cultural differences often expressed as differences between means while also recognizing the individuality of each participant in their samples and each member of the cultures they study. If we persist in our use of the common view, we merely perpetuate stereotypes of people based on differences across cultures, which is clearly incorrect, at least methodologically if not ethically. We need to force ourselves to get away from using the common view, and any other similar views, and get back to understanding people in different cultures as individuals, not as stereotypic representations of a culture-level concept.

Just as culture-level effects do not translate to individuals, individual-level effects do not necessarily translate to cultures. Takano and Osaka's (2018) review in this issue as well as other reviews (Matsumoto, 1999, 2002; Matsumoto et al., 1996; Oyserman et al., 2002; Takano & Osaka, 1997, 1999) have demonstrated that the

common view is clearly not supported on the level of individuals. These data, however, do not necessarily speak to culture-level effects. American culture on a group or societal level may indeed be individualistic; likewise, Japanese culture on a group or societal level may indeed be collectivistic. These claims, however, require renewed research on the group or societal level. Such research would likely involve data gathered outside of people, such as books, mass media, institutional practices, and group-level norms, along with many other group-level data as basic data points for study as well as data aggregated across people. Such continued research is necessary and should be linked to individual-level data through multilevel analyses and other such empirical approaches in the future. We should embrace such approaches that go beyond simple, stereotypic notions such as the common view to forge new theories and methodologies in cross-cultural science. Let us use the shortcomings of our disciplinary past to inform more psychologically sensitive research and knowledge to the many stakeholder consumers of our research in the future.

### Acknowledgement

I thank Michael Bond and Hyeon C. Hwang for their helpful comments on a previous version of this article.

### References

- Allik, J., & Realo, A. (in press). Culture and personality. In D. Matsumoto & H. C. Hwang (Eds.), *Oxford handbook of culture and psychology*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Bhawuk, D. P. S., & Brislin, R. W. (1992). The measurement of intercultural sensitivity using the concepts of individualism and collectivism. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 16(4), 413–436. doi:10.1016/0147-1767(92)90031-o
- Bond, M. H. (Ed.). (1988). *The cross-cultural challenge to social psychology*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Bond, M. H. (2002). Reclaiming the individual from Hofstede's ecological analysis—A 20-year Odyssey: Comment on Oyserman et al. (2002). *Psychological Bulletin*, 128(1), 73–77. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.128.1.73
- Bond, M. H. (2004, August). *The third stage of cross-cultural psychology: Some personal prescriptions for our future*. Paper presented at the 17th International Congress of the International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology, Xi-an, China.
- Bond, M. H. (in press). Traveling from the past into the future of cross-cultural psychology: A personal-scientific journey. In D. Matsumoto & H. C. Hwang (Eds.), *Oxford handbook of culture and psychology*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Bond, M. H., Leung, K., Au, A., Tong, K. K., Reimel de Carrasquel, S., Murakami, F., & Lewis, J. R. (2004). Culture-level dimensions of social axioms and their correlates across 41 cultures. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 35, 548–570. doi:10.1177/0022022104268388
- Brewer, M. B. (2004). Taking the origins of human nature seriously: Toward a more imperialist social psychology. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 8(2), 107–113. doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr0802\_3
- Byrne, B. M., & Matsumoto, D. (in press). The evolution of multigroup comparison testing across culture: Past, present, and future perspectives. In B. G. Adams & M. Bender (Eds.), *Methods make it or break it: The role of assessment in culture and psychology*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Cai, H., Huang, J., & Jing, Y. (in press). Living in a changing world: The change of culture and psychology. In D. Matsumoto & H. C. Hwang (Eds.), *Oxford handbook of culture and psychology*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Campbell, D. T. (1958). Common fate, similarity, and other indices of the status of aggregates of person as social entities. *Behavioural Science*, 3, 14–25. doi: 10.1002/bs.3830030103
- Cross, S., & Morris, M. L. (2003). Getting to know you: The relational self-construal, relational cognition, and well-being. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 29(4), 512–523. doi:10.1177/0146167202250920
- Cross, S., Morris, M. L., & Gore, J. S. (2002). Thinking about oneself and others: The relational-interdependent self-construal and social cognition. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 82, 399–418. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.82.3.399
- Fontaine, J. R. J., & Fischer, R. (2011). Data analytic approaches for investigating isomorphism between the individual-level and the cultural-level internal structure. In D. Matsumoto & F. J. R. Van de Vijver (Eds.), *Cross-cultural research methods* (pp. 273–298). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Gardner, W. L., Gabriel, S., & Lee, A. Y. (1999). “I” value freedom, but “we” value relationships: Self-construal priming mirrors cultural differences in judgment. *Psychological Science*, 10(4), 321–326. doi: 10.1111/1467-9280.00162
- Greenwald, A. G., & Pratkanis, A. R. (1984). The self. In R. S. Wyer & T. K. Srull (Eds.), *Handbook of social cognition*, Vol. 3 (pp. 129–178). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Guisinger, S., & Blatt, S. J. (1994). Individuality and relatedness: Evolution of a fundamental dialectic. *American Psychologist*, 49, 104–111. doi:10.1037/0003-066x.49.2.104
- Hermans, H. J. M., & Kempen, H. J. G. (1998). Moving cultures: The perilous problems of cultural dichotomies in a globalizing society. *American Psychologist*, 53, 1111–1120. doi:10.1037/0003-066x.53.10.1111
- Hofstede, G. H. (1980). *Culture's consequences: International differences in work-related values*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Hofstede, G. H. (1984). *Culture's consequences: International differences in work-related values* (Abridged ed.). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Hofstede, G. H. (2001). *Culture's consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions and organizations across nations* (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Hornsey, M. J., & Jetten, J. (2004). The individual within the group: Balancing the need to belong with the need to be different. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 8(3), 248–264. doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr0803\_2
- House, R. J., Hanges, P. J., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P., & Gupta, V. (2003). *GLOBE, cultures, leadership, and organizations: GLOBE study of 62 societies*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

- Kâğıtçıbaşı, C. (1994). A critical appraisal of individualism and collectivism: Toward a new formulation. In U. Kim, H. C. Triandis, C. Kâğıtçıbaşı, S.-C. Choi, & G. Yoon (Eds.), *Individualism and collectivism: Theory, method, and applications* (Vol. 18, pp. 52–65). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Kâğıtçıbaşı, C. (1996). The autonomous-relational self: A new synthesis. *European Psychologist, 1*, 180–186. doi:10.1027/1016-9040.1.3.180
- Kashima, E. S., & Hardie, E. A. (2000). The development and validation of the Relational, Individualism, and Collectivism self-aspects (RIC) Scale. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 3*, 19–48. doi:10.1111/1467-839x.00053
- Kashima, Y., Kokubo, T., Kashima, E. S., Boxall, D., Yamaguchi, S., & Macrae, K. (2004). Culture and self: Are there within-culture differences in self between metropolitan areas and regional cities? *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30*(7), 816–823. doi:10.1177/0146167203261997
- Kashima, Y., Yamaguchi, S., Kim, U., & Choi, S. C. (1995). Culture, gender, and self: A perspective from individualism-collectivism research. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69*, 925–937. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.69.5.925
- Kimmelmeier, M., & Cheng, B. Y.-M. (2004). Language and self-construal priming: A replication and extension in a Hong Kong sample. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 35*, 705–712. doi:10.1177/0022022104270112
- Kosmitzki, C. (1996). The reaffirmation of cultural identity in cross-cultural encounters. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22*, 238–248. doi:10.1177/0146167296223002
- Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation. *Psychological Review, 98*(2), 224–253. doi:10.1037/0033-295x.98.2.224
- Matsumoto, D. (1990). Cultural similarities and differences in display rules. *Motivation and Emotion, 14*, 195–214. doi:10.1007/bf00995569
- Matsumoto, D. (1992). American-Japanese cultural differences in the recognition of universal facial expressions. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 23*(1), 72–84. doi:10.1177/0022022192231005
- Matsumoto, D. (1999). Culture and self: An empirical assessment of Markus and Kitayama's theory of independent and interdependent self-construals. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 2*, 289–310. doi:10.1111/1467-839x.00042
- Matsumoto, D. (2002). *The new Japan*. Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press.
- Matsumoto, D. (2006). Culture and cultural worldviews: Do verbal descriptions of culture reflect anything other than verbal descriptions of culture? *Culture and Psychology, 12*(1), 33–62. doi:10.1177/1354067x06061592
- Matsumoto, D., Consolacion, T., Yamada, H., Suzuki, R., Franklin, B., Paul, S., & Uchida, H. (2002). American-Japanese cultural differences in judgments of emotional expressions of different intensities. *Cognition & Emotion, 16*(6), 721–747. doi:10.1080/02699930143000608
- Matsumoto, D., & Ekman, P. (1989). American-Japanese cultural differences in intensity ratings of facial expressions of emotion. *Motivation and Emotion, 13*(2), 143–157. doi:10.1007/bf00992959
- Matsumoto, D., Kasri, F., & Kookan, K. (1999). American-Japanese cultural differences in judgments of expression intensity and subjective experience. *Cognition & Emotion, 13*, 201–218. doi:10.1080/026999399379339
- Matsumoto, D., Kudoh, T., & Takeuchi, S. (1996). Changing patterns of individualism and collectivism in the United States and Japan. *Culture and Psychology, 2*, 77–107. doi:10.1177/1354067x9621005
- Matsumoto, D., Weissman, M., Preston, K., Brown, B., & Kupperbusch, C. (1997). Context-specific measurement of individualism-collectivism on the individual level: The IC Interpersonal Assessment Inventory (ICIAI). *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 28*, 743–767. doi:10.1177/0022022197286006
- Matsumoto, D., & Yoo, S. H. (2006). Toward a new generation of cross-cultural research. *Perspectives on Psychological Science, 1*(3), 234–250. doi:10.1111/j.1745-6916.2006.00014.x
- Niedenthal, P., & Beike, D. (1997). Interrelated and isolated self-concepts. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 1*(2), 106–128. doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr0102\_1
- Oyserman, D. (1993). The lens of personhood: Viewing the self and others in a multicultural society. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65*, 993–1009. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.65.5.993
- Oyserman, D., Coon, H. M., & Kimmelmeier, M. (2002). Rethinking individualism and collectivism: Evaluation of theoretical assumptions and meta-analyses. *Psychological Bulletin, 128*(1), 3–72. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.128.1.3
- Oyserman, D., Gant, L., & Ager, J. (1995). A socially contextualized model of African American identity: Possible selves and school persistence. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69*, 1216–1232. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.69.6.1216
- Poortinga, Y. H., Van de Vijver, F. J. R., Joe, R. C., & van de Koppel, J. M. H. (1987). Peeling the onion called culture: A synopsis. In C. Kâğıtçıbaşı (Ed.), *Growth and progress in cross-cultural psychology* (pp. 22–34). Berwyn, PA: Swets North America.
- Rhee, E., Uleman, J. S., & Lee, H. K. (1996). Variations in collectivism and individualism by ingroup and culture: Confirmatory factor analyses. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71*, 1037–1054. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.71.5.1037
- Rosenmann, A., & Kurman, J. (in press). The culturally situated self. In D. Matsumoto & H. C. Hwang (Eds.), *Oxford handbook of culture and psychology*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Schwartz, S. H. (2004). Mapping and interpreting cultural differences around the world. In H. Vinken, J. Soeters, & P. Ester (Eds.), *Comparing cultures, dimensions of culture in a comparative perspective* (pp. 43–73). Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill.
- Smith, P. B. (in press). Dimensions of cultural variation. In D. Matsumoto & H. C. Hwang (Eds.), *Oxford handbook of culture and psychology*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Takano, Y., & Osaka, E. (1997). Nihonjin no shuudanshugi to amerikajin no kojinshugi: Tsusetsu no saikentou [Japanese collectivism and American individualism: Reconsidering the common view]. *Japanese Journal of Psychology, 68*, 312–327 (in Japanese). doi:10.4992/jjpsy.68.312
- Takano, Y., & Osaka, E. (1999). An unsupported common view: Comparing Japan and the U.S. on individualism/collectivism. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 2*(3), 311–341. doi:10.1111/1467-839x.00043
- Takano, Y., & Osaka, E. (2018). Comparing Japan and the U.S. on individualism/collectivism: A follow-up review. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 21*, 301–316. doi:10.1111/ajsp.12322
- Trafimow, D., Silverman, E. S., Fan, R. M.-T., & Law, J. S. F. (1997). The effects of language and priming on the relative accessibility of

- the private self and collective self. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 28(1), 107–123. doi:10.1177/0022022197281007
- Trafimow, D., Triandis, H. C., & Goto, S. G. (1991). Some tests of the distinction between the private self and the collective self. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 60, 649–655. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.60.5.649
- Triandis, H. C. (1989). The self and social behavior in differing cultural contexts. *Psychological Review*, 96, 506–520. doi:10.1037/0033-295x.96.3.506
- Uleman, J. S., Rhee, E., Bardoliwalla, N., Semin, G., & Toyama, M. (2000). The relational self: Closeness to ingroups depends on who they are, culture, and the type of closeness. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 3, 1–17. doi:10.1111/1467-839x.00052
- Verkuyten, M., & Pouliasi, K. (2002). Biculturalism among older children: Cultural frame switching, attributions, self-identification, and attitudes. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 33(6), 596–609. doi:10.1177/0022022102238271
- Vignoles, V. L., Owe, E., Becker, M., Smith, P. B., Easterbrook, M. J., Brown, R., & Bond, M. H. (2016). Beyond the ‘east–west’ dichotomy: Global variation in cultural models of selfhood. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, 145, 966–1000. doi:10.1037/xge0000175
- van de Vijver, F. J. R., & Poortinga, Y. H. (2002). Structural equivalence in multilevel research. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 33(2), 141–156. doi:10.1177/0022022102033002002.
- Waterman, A. S. (1981). Individualism and interdependence. *American Psychologist*, 36(7), 762–773. doi:10.1037/0003-066x.36.7.762
- Ybarra, O., & Trafimow, D. (1988). How priming the private self or collective self affects the relative weights of attitudes and subjective norms. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 24, 362–370. doi:10.1177/0146167298244003